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We examine the impact of political reservation for disadvantaged minority groups on poverty. To address
the concern that political reservation is endogenous, we take advantage of the state-time variation in
reservation in state legislative assemblies in India generated by national policies that cause reservations
to be revised and the time lags with which revised reservations are implemented. Using data on sixteen
major Indian states for the period 1960-2000, we find that increasing the share of seats reserved for
Scheduled Tribes significantly reduces poverty while increasing the share of seats reserved for Scheduled
Castes has no impact on poverty. Political reservation for Scheduled Tribes has a greater effect on














Many countries have armative action policies, which give preferential treatment to
historically disadvantaged minority groups. These policies are extremely controversial. One
set of issues relates to whether these policies benet the intended beneciaries. Do the policies
actually improve the socioeconomic outcomes of the minority groups? Which members of
the minority groups benet? A second set of issues relates to the redistributive nature of
armative action policies. If minority groups are given preferential treatment, then aren't
non-minority groups made worse o? To the extent that armative action policies confer
few or no benets to minority groups and hurt members of non-minority groups, then society
might be worse o with such policies. While there is some empirical work on the eect of
armative action on the intended beneciaries, there is little that quanties its overall eects
(a brief review of the related literature is provided in Section 2). This paper takes a step
forward by examining the eect of one type of armative action, political reservation, on
overall poverty in India. To our knowledge, this is the rst paper that estimates the impact
of an armative action policy on poverty.
Poverty is a relevant outcome to study. First, poverty reduction is a major objective
of public policy, especially in developing countries. Second, poverty rates are a tangible
and frequently used measure of well-being. It remains an open question whether armative
action successfully reduces poverty. It is expected to, given that historically disadvantaged
minority groups account for a disproportionate share of the poor. However, if the benets
accrue only to the relatively well o members of minority groups and hurt the less well o
members of non-minority groups, armative action can increase overall poverty!
India accounts for one-third of the world's poor, with about two-fths of its population
living below the international poverty line of $1:25 per day (Chen and Ravallion, 2008).
It also has the largest and among the most aggressive armative action programs in the
world, with seats explicitly set aside for members of disadvantaged minority groups (i.e., the
1Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs)) in higher education, public sector em-
ployment and political representation. Obviously these armative action programs, though
in place for over 60 years, have not been sucient to eliminate poverty. However, India's
poverty rate has declined rapidly over this time period{between 1981 and 2005 alone, it
declined from 60% of the population living below $1.25 per day to 42%{and it is of interest
to understand the extent to which armation action contributed to this decline.
In general, regressing the outcome of interest on the measure of the armation action
policy will not give the causal eect of the policy. This is because the policy variable is likely
to be endogenous. For example, places where more minorities get elected may dier from
places where fewer minorities get elected in ways that also aect the outcome, such as in
their level of development or attitude toward minorities. Fortunately in the case of political
reservations for minorities in India, there are institutional features that can be exploited
to identify the causal eect of minority political representation. In particular, variation
in minority political representation in the state legislative assembly arises from changes in
the minority share of the population as measured by the census (the Indian Constitution
calls for the share of seats reserved for SCs and STs in the each state to equal to their
share of the state population in the last preceding decennial census) and the time lags with
which reservations based on the new census shares are implemented (not until the state's
rst election after the reservations are revised via a formal delimitation process). We use
this within-state cross-time variation in share of seats reserved for minorities to identify the
eect of minority representation on poverty. We elaborate on this empirical strategy, which
originated in Pande (2003), in Section 3.
We implement this empirical strategy using state panel data on sixteen Indian states
for the period 1960-2000 (we describe these data in Section 4). In Section 5, we present
the estimation results. Our main nding is that increasing the share of seats reserved for
minorities reduces overall poverty. Additionally, we nd that it is political reservation for STs
alone that signicantly reduces poverty; SC political reservation has no impact on poverty.
2These results are in line with Pande (2003), who found that ST and SC reservation in state
legislative assemblies have dierent policy eects, with the former increasing spending on ST
welfare programs and the latter increasing the number of state government jobs set aside for
minorities. Welfare programs primarily target the poor whereas reserved jobs are open even
to better o minorities, so it is not unexpected given Pande's results that ST reservation
would reduce poverty (while SC reservation would not). These results survive a variety of
robustness checks, including allowing for nonlinear eects of minority population share.
Next, we explore some potential explanations for the dierential impact of ST and SC
reservation: geographic isolation (STs tend to be more segregated, which might facilitate
targeting of aid), social heterogeneity (greater caste fragmentation might make cooperation
more dicult) and support for the Congress Party (which under Indira Gandhi has a well-
advertised aim to reduce poverty). We nd some evidence suggesting that greater caste
fragmentation reduces the eectiveness of SC reservation in ghting poverty. A nal empirical
exercise is to examine whether the eect of ST and SC reservation in the state legislative
assemblies changed after the passage of the 73rd and 74th Amendments in 1993, which
devolved more power to local governing bodies. We nd that ST reservation has an even




This study adds to the large literature on armative action (see Holzer and Neumark
(2000) for a review, though it is focused on the United States context), including a rapidly
growing one in the Indian context. In this subsection, we briey discuss the empirical studies
in the Indian context.
Galanter (1984) provides a rich analysis of the various armative action policies (in
3employment, education and political representation) for the SCs and STs, but does not
quantify their eects.1 More recently, a number of papers have estimated the impact of
political reservation (Duo (2005) oers a review). Some institutional features of India's
political reservation policy enable researchers to convincingly identify its eects. Pande
(2003) takes advantage of the time lag between when a new census count is taken and when
its results are applied to political reservations in the state legislature to identify the eect of
minority representation in the state legislature on policy outcomes. She nds that increasing
minority representation increases transfers to minorities: ST reservation increased spending
on ST welfare programs, and SC reservation increased the share of state government jobs
set aside for minorities. Additionally, ST reservation lowered education spending and overall
government spending. These results clearly establish that legislator identity matters for
policy outcomes, but as Pande writes in her conclusion, \It would, however, be premature
to view this paper's ndings as suggesting that political reservation is a welfare-enhancing
policy" (p. 1147). Our paper extends Pande's paper by examining poverty as an outcome;
we use the same identication strategy, also use state panel data, and also are concerned
with SC and ST representation in the state legislature.
Several studies on the eects of political reservation examine a more local level of gov-
ernment, the Gram Panchayat (village council) level. Each Gram Panchayat is comprised of
a small group of villages and is responsible for the administration of public goods in these
villages. Some seats for pradhan (chief of the Gram Panchayat) are reserved for minorities
and women, with the reserved seats randomly assigned across Gram Panchayats. This ran-
dom assignment feature has been exploited by researchers to identify the eects of political
reservation for minorities and women on the allocation of local public goods. The rst of
these studies was Duo and Chattopadhyay (2004), who nd that Gram Panchayats that are
randomly assigned a female pradhan tend to spend more on public goods that women con-
1Dushkin (1972) and Parikh (1997) also provide useful background information on social groups and
politics in India.
4sider more important, such as drinking water and roads in West Bengal and drinking water
in Rajasthan. Besley, Pande, Rahman and Rao (2004), using data from Andhra Pradesh,
Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, nd that having a SC/ST pradhan signicantly increases the
probability that SC/ST households have a toilet, electric connection or private water line
provided by a government program since the last local election. Bardhan, Mookherjee and
Parra Torrado (2010), using data from West Bengal, nd that households in villages with
a SC/ST pradhan tend to receive more benets from the local government, particularly for
housing and toilet construction and improvements. Interestingly, within villages, there is a
redistribution of employment program benets away from non-SC/ST landless households
toward SC/ST households when there is a SC/ST pradhan. Finally, Duo, Fischer and
Chattopadhyay (2008) nd that having a SC pradhan signicantly increases public goods
provided to hamlets where SC are concentrated.
The above studies convincingly show that political reservation aects policy outcomes and
public goods provision in India, and seems to redistribute resources in favor of the targeted
groups. But given the multifaceted eects, including increases in some types of resources but
reductions in others, it is an empirical question whether political reservations provide net
benets to the populace. Our paper approaches this question by estimating the reduced-form
eect of political reservations for minorities on overall poverty. We do not purport to know or
be able to estimate India's social welfare function. We note, though, that poverty reduction
is a major objective of the Indian government, and therefore it is of interest to know, when all
the changes in policy and resource allocation are taken together, whether political reservation
for minorities reduced poverty. Does helping minorities through political reservations end up
hurting the poor? If it does, then society must weigh the benets to minorities against the
harm to the poor. Otherwise, it can feel assured that helping minorities also helps alleviate
poverty, which might soften some opponents of political reservation for minorities.
This is the rst study to our knowledge that estimates the eect of any type of armation
action policy on poverty. Additionally, it is one of only a few studies that estimates the net
5eect of armative action.2 Studies have tended to focus on the eect of armative action
on intended beneciaries, which we agree is the rst step in the evaluation of armative
action. There is good evidence in US and India that armative action does redistribute
resources to the benet of the targeted groups, so the next step is to gure out the net
benets (net of costs, including any costs to non-targeted groups).
2.2 Reservation in State Legislative Assemblies for Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes in India
Scheduled castes (groups having low social and ritual standing) and scheduled tribes
(groups distinguished by their tribal culture and physical isolation) have historically been
excluded from opportunities and rights that lead to socioeconomic advancement in Indian
society.3 Combined with low social mobility{social group is hereditary, and marrying outside
one's group is rare{the discrimination has led to poor socioeconomic outcomes for STs and
SCs that are repeated generation after generation. In 2004-05, the share of the population
living below the ocial Indian poverty line was 46% of STs and 37% of SCs; in contrast,
it was 23% among non SC/STs.4 Thus the STs and SCs account for a disproportionate of
India's poor: STs make up 8:6% of India's overall population but 14% of its poor, and SCs
2Bertrand, Hanna and Mullainathan (2010) estimate the eect of armation action in college admissions
in India. They collect data on the labor market outcomes of applicants to an engineering college, and nd that
marginal lower caste group applicants benet from attending the college (which they would not have been
able to attend without the armative action program). However, the benet is greater for the marginal high
caste group applicant admitted compared to the marginal low caste group applicant admitted, suggesting
that reserving college seats for lower caste group members leads to an inecient allocation of educational
slots. Chattopadhyay, Duo and Fischer (2008) test for whether Gram Panchayats behave eciently. They
nd that having an SC pradhan changes the composition of public goods provided, which indicates that
the Gram Panchayat was not behaving eciently under the assumption that preferences are homothetic.
In this situation, reservation for minorities would raise eciency{for a given level of resources allocated to
minorities, the mix would now be allocated in greater accordance with their preferences.
3In the British era, these were called the depressed classes, and colloquially they have also been called
the untouchables and backward classes though these terms are out of favor. The Constitution (Scheduled
Castes) Order of 1950 and the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order of 1950 lists which castes, races and
tribes are designated SCs and STs, respectively. Pande (2003)'s Table 2 provides a concise summary of the
criteria used to designate communities as SCs or STs.
4These gures are calculated based on data from the 61st round of the National Sample Survey, a nation-
ally representative sample of households in India.
6make up 20% of the population but 27% of the poor.
To improve the well-being of the SCs and STs, various armative action policies for SCs
and STs have been instituted in the Indian Constitution. As far as political reservation is
concerned, the original Indian Constitution (which took eect on January 26, 1950, creat-
ing the Republic of India) mandates representation for SCs and STs in the lower house of
Parliament (i.e., the Lok Sabha, the directly elected national legislative assembly) and the
state legislative assemblies. Additionally, the 73rd and 74th Amendments of 1992 mandated
representation for SCs and STs at more local levels of government.5 The seats for SCs and
STs are set aside in proportion to their respective share of the total population in the state
or part of state. Only members of the SC (ST) may stand for election in constituencies that
have been reserved for SCs (STs), but voters of all social groups in the territorial constituency
get to vote regardless of whether their constituency is reserved.
Since our empirical work concerns political reservation for SCs and STs in the state
legislature, we proceed by providing more detail about the role of the state legislature, how
reservations in the state legislature are set and how they change. India is a federal union
of states. The state governments serve populations that are larger than many nations6
and have a good deal of autonomy from the central government. The Indian Constitution
delineates the responsibilities of the state and central governments, with some items under
the exclusive control of the central government, some under the exclusive control of the
states and other items under joint jurisdiction. Among the items in the state governments'
purview are public order, police, public health and sanitation, intrastate roads, water, land,
5The 73rd Amendment concerns local governing bodies in rural areas (including the Gram Panchayats),
and 74th Amendment concerns local governing bodies in urban areas. These amendments aimed to decen-
tralize government in India; in Section 5.4, we assess whether this devolution of power from state to local
governments changed the impact of SC and ST reservation in the state legislatures. In addition to the
provisions for minority political representation, these amendments called for at least one-third of the seats
in these local governing bodies to be reserved for women; prior to this, there was no political reservation for
women in India. See Duo (2005) for more on political reservation for women.
6The 16 states in our sample range in population from 10 million (Jammu and Kashmir) to 166 million
(Uttar Pradesh) according to the 2001 Census. These 16 states make up for over 95% of India's total
population of one billion.
7agriculture and industries. Though items like education, social security and social insurance,
and labor are under joint jurisdiction, in practice, state governments assume much of the
responsibility. The primary way in which state legislative assemblies can aect outcomes in
the state is through the allocation of state government spending. During the span of our
data, 1960-2000, state governments undertook over half of total government expenditures
in India (Khemani, 2004; Rao and Singh, 2001). Other ways include making laws, setting
priorities, and managing lower levels of government. Thus the state legislature does have the
meaningful power, and its composition can therefore have measurable consequences.
Reservation for SCs and STs in the state legislative assemblies follows a single policy rule
that applies to all states: according to Article 332 of the Indian Constitution, the number
of seats reserved for SCs and STs is such that the share of total seats in the state assembly
reserved for each group equals that group's share of the total state population in the last
preceding census. This policy rule makes clear where variation in minority political repre-
sentation comes from. The primary source is the arrival of new census population gures.
In this case, the Delimitation Commission is responsible for delimiting the constituencies for
the national and state legislatures based on the new population data, revising the number
of seats reserved in each state for SCs and STs based on the revised constituencies and each
group's population share in the new census, and designating which specic constituencies
are reserved for SCs and STs.7 In our data set, which spans 1960-2000, the arrival of the
1961 and 1971 census counts caused reservations to change in the late 1960s and mid-1970s,
respectively. The 42nd Amendment to the constitution in 1976 suspended new delimitations
until after 2000, so reserved seats are based on the 1971 census to the end of our data period.8
7The Delimitation Commission is an ad hoc national committee formed after a census is taken, and is
comprised of a supreme (national) court judge, high (state) court judge and the chief election commissioner.
In each state, constituencies with the largest ST population are reserved for STs rst. Which constituencies
are reserved for SCs also depends on where SC population is higher, but with the constraint that the seats
reserved for SCs be dispersed across the state.
8The intention behind freezing constituencies based on the 1971 census was to assure states that their
representation in Parliament would not be perversely impacted by the successful implementation of family
planning policies. The 84th Amendment in 2001 extended the freeze on the number of constituencies in Par-
liament and in the state legislative assemblies until after 2026, but permitted the adjustment of the territorial
8Variation in share of seats reserved for SCs and STs also arises from institutional changes
imposed from the national government. First, when the number of constituencies change,
the share of seats reserved could change since the number of seats must be an integer.
In 1961, two-seat constituencies were abolished, leading to fewer seats (previously, a given
constituency could have multiple seats). Second, when the denition of SC or ST changes,
the share of seats reserved change. The Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Orders Act of
1976, which mandated that a social group dened as a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe in
any part of the state will be dened as so in the entire state, led to revised census gures for
the SC and ST population and consequently revised reservations.9 Finally, when a state's
borders changes, then its calculated minority population share will change, leading to changes
in the share of seats reserved; this is variation that we do not use in our empirical work
since we want states that are consistently dened over time. The Punjab Reorganization
Act of 1966, in which the Punjab then in existence was divided into present-day Punjab and
the new state of Haryana, is the instance during our 1960-2000 sample period in which some
state borders changed.10
Table 1 summarizes the sources of variation in share of seats reserved for SCs and STs in
state assemblies discussed above. It must be noted that reserved seats in state assemblies are
not adjusted immediately after the arrival of a new census count or the institutional changes.
Instead, they are applied to the next election, when the current (typically ve-year) term of
all the members of the state legislative assembly end and voters must elect all new members
for the next term. Since state elections are not held at the same time across states, the
same arrival of a new census count or institutional change causes the share of seats reserved
boundaries of the constituencies and the reservations. The Delimitation Act, 2002 adjusted boundaries and
the number of reserved seats based on the 2001 census, and was implemented beginning in 2008.
9It should be emphasized that the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order of 1950 and the Constitution
(Scheduled Tribes) Order of 1950 make clear which groups are considered SCs and STs in each state. What
the SC/ST Orders Act did was to make uniform the denition of SC/ST within a state.
10As we decribe in Section 4, Punjab and Haryana do not enter our sample until 1967, after the division.
A small part of Punjab was added to Himachal Pradesh, a union territory that became a state in 1971 and
which is not part of our analysis.
9to change in multiple years (the middle column of Table 1 shows the rst year the revised
reservations could have been implemented), changing sooner in states that happen to have
a state election sooner. These sources of changes in seats reserved, and the time lags with
which they take eect, will be exploited for identifying the eects of reservation below.
3 Empirical Strategy
In theory, minority political reservation could increase or decrease poverty. Previous
studies have found that political reservations for minorities tend to change policies and the
allocation of public goods in favor of minorities. Such changes can be expected to improve
the well-being of at least some minorities, and even non-minorities in poverty might benet
to the extent that these changes encapsulate more general anti-poverty measures than would
otherwise have been undertaken. However, there might be elite capture (in which only the
better o among the minorities receive the benets) or the displacement of resources for non-
minorities in poverty. In India, though the poverty rate is higher among minorities (40%
for SCs and STs compared to 23% for the rest of the population in 2004-05), the number of
people in poverty is higher among non-minorities (12 million in poverty among SCs and STs
compared to 17 million in poverty in the rest of the population). In this context, helping
minorities is not synonymous with reducing poverty{it could be that benets are mostly
go to the SCs and STs above the poverty line, or that the costs are borne predominantly
by the non-minority poor. Thus, it is an empirical question whether minority political
representation on net reduces poverty.
Suppose the relationship between minority share of legislative seats and poverty could be
approximated as:
yst = s + t + Minority Repst + est (1)
10where yst is the poverty rate in state s observed at time t. The variable Minority Repst is
the percentage of legislative seats held by minorities. s is the state xed eects and control
for any time-invariant state characteristics on poverty. t is the time xed eects and control
for any macroeconomic shocks or national policies that aected all states uniformly. Finally,
est is the error term. The coecient of primary interest is , which estimates the eect of
minority political representation on poverty. In general, estimating Equation 1 by ordinary
least squares (OLS) would not provide the causal eect of minority political representation.
This is because in general, there would be omitted variables bias{places that tend to elect
more minorities likely dier in ways that aect poverty as well. For example, they might be
less discriminatory, which aects both the election outcomes of minorities as well as their
economic outcomes. Or, they might be more socially progressive, which causes more minority
candidates to be elected as well as more anti-poverty policies. State xed eects mitigate this
concern somewhat; however, there might be time-varying state characteristics that matter,
such as changing attitudes about minorities.
In the case of India, though, such omitted variables bias is averted because minority
political representation in the state legislative assemblies is determined by a simple policy rule
that applies to all states.11 This rule, that the share of the state's legislative assembly seats
reserved for minorities must equal their share of the state's population, leaves no discretion
on the part of individual states as far as minority political representation is concerned. As
discussed in the previous section, all changes in reserved seats for minorities arise from the
arrival of a new census count or institutional changes imposed from the central government.
Thus, estimating Equation 1 using panel data on Indian states in the post-1950 era (after
the Indian Constitution, which contained the rule, took eect) would lead to a less biased
estimate of  than in the general case. However, an important concern remains: minority
11Though SCs and STs can stand for election in unreserved constituencies, in fact virtually no seat has
been won by SCs and STs in unreserved constituencies. Therefore, there is no dierence between share of
state legislative assembly seats held by SCs and STs and share of seats reserved for SCs and STs, and so
the eect of minority political reservation that we estimate has the interpretation as the eect of minority
political representation (in a context where there is armative action for minorities).
11population share is positively correlated with minority political representation through the
policy rule, but it might be correlated with poverty, too, for reasons other than minority
political representation. This is quite plausible; for example, some resources may be allocated
approximately on a headcount basis.
The obvious solution to address this concern{that minority population share is an omitted
variable{is to add it as a control to Equation 1. If minority population share always exactly
equalled share of seats reserved for minorities, though, there would be perfect collinearity and
it would be impossible to separate out the eect of minority political representation. But in
the case of India, three features of the policy rule and its implementation help us address the
problem. First, the policy rule is based on minority population share in the last preceding
census. Thus, we can control for minority population share of state s at time t in Equation 1
while still having variation left in the political reservation variable since the latter is based on
a census (not an intercensal) population count. Second, the policy rule is implemented with
a time lag. On the one hand, it takes several years for the Delimitation Commission to revise
constituencies and reservations on the basis of the new census data. On the other hand, it
could take several more years before a state implements the new reservations; states that
have an election scheduled soon after the Delimitation Commission nishes would implement
the new reservations earlier. Because of this time lag, we can control for minority population
share in the last decennial census taken before time t while still having variation left in the
political reservation variable. Third, the policy rule must be implemented subject to the
constraint that the number of seats be an integer value. Thus due to rounding o to an
integer, generally the reserved share of seats and the minority population share measured in
the last preceding census do not match exactly.
Figure 1 illustrates the main intuition of our identication strategy. For the hypothetical
state depicted, elections are held every ve years beginning with 1962 for the 1960-2000
period. Due to the time lag between when a census is taken and when reservations based
on it are implemented, the share of seats reserved for SC/ST diers from the SC/ST share
12of the population in the last census in some years. Thus, between 1961 and 1966, although
the 1961 census is available, this state's reserved seats continue to be based on the 1951
census. Between 1971 and 1976, although the 1971 census is available, the reservations are
based on 1961 census gures. Between 1977 and 2000, reservations continued to be based
on 1971 census gures{even after the 1981 and 1991 censuses become available{due to the
42nd Amendment of 1976 suspending new delimitations until after 2000.12 Additionally,
since population is changing year to year, the current minority population share is in general
dierent from both the minority population share measured in the last census and the share
of seats reserved. Thus, it is possible to control for minority population share in the current
year as well as in the most recent census and still identify the eect of share of seats reserved
for minorities.
Modifying Equation 1 to address the problem of omitted minority population share, we
get:
yst = s + t + Minority Repst + 1Current Popst + 2Census Popst + Xst + est (2)
where Current Popst is the minority share of the population in state s at time t and
Census Popst is the minority share of the population in state s at the time of the last
preceding census.13 In some of our estimated regression models below, we will also control
for some additional variables, Xst (specically, per capita state income last year, dummy for
election year, population density in last preceding census, rural share of population and total
population).
12This was discussed in Section 2.2.
13For the census years in our sample, i.e., t=1961, 1971, 1977, 1981 and 1991, the Current Popst is
identical to Census Popst. Although 1977 is not technically a census year, it was the year where SC/ST
population shares based on the 1971 census were revised pursuant to the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled
Tribe Orders Act of 1976. This was described in Section 2.2.
134 Data
We implement our empirical strategy using state panel data on the sixteen major Indian
states covering the period 1960-2000.14 These are the states that existed in India following
the States Reorganization Act of 1956, which divided India into linguistic-based states.15
These states contain 95% of the Indian population during the period of study.16 The state
is an appropriate unit of analysis for the research question at hand{the state legislature is
making decisions about resource allocation and policies, and we are asking whether minority
representation in the legislature aects poverty through these decisions.17 In total we have
627 state-year observations.18
The variables used in our empirical analysis are gathered from various Indian government
sources. We describe these variables below. Basically, our data set is the same as the one
used in Pande (2003) but updated to 2000 and with poverty data added.19
Poverty outcomes: Our primary measure of poverty is the headcount ratio, which is
the proportion of the population below the poverty line. To capture intensity of poverty, we
use two additional measures: the poverty gap index (which is headcount ratio multiplied by
the mean percentage shortfall of consumption from the poverty line among the poor) and
squared poverty gap index (which is a variant of the poverty gap index that gives even more
14These states are Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka,
Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West
Bengal.
15There were thirteen states dened under this act, but in 1960 the state of Bombay was divided into
Gujarat and Maharashtra, and in 1966 Punjab was divided into Haryana and Punjab.
16Excluded from our analysis are the union territories dened in the States Reorganization Act of 1956,
which do not have the same degree of autonomy from the central government as the states. Some of these
union territories have since attained statehood.
17Even with microdata, the policy variable remains at the state-time level. However, microdata would
permit greater exploration of heterogeneity of eects, which could be a worthwhile future exercise.
18With 16 states and 41 years, there are 656 potential state-year cells. We lose 29 cells due to the following.
First, Haryana and Punjab enter the data set in 1967; before 1967, Haryana was part of Punjab so Punjab
pre-1967 had dierent borders and population than post-1967. Second, Gujarat and Maharashtra enter the
data set in 1962; though formed in 1960, data on elections (and so, reserved seats) is rst available in 1962.
Finally, for Jammu and Kashmir, 1962 is the rst year when data on elections (and so, reserved seats) is
available, and poverty data is not available after 1991.
19We thank Rohini Pande for providing us the data and Stata code used in her paper.
14weight to very poor).20 The World Bank, as part of its India Poverty Project, provides a
consistently dened data series on headcount ratio, poverty gap index and squared poverty
gap index using household-level consumption expenditure data from the National Sample
Survey (NSS).21 The poverty measures for the 1960-2000 period are based on 25 rounds of
the NSS.22 In constructing the measures, Ozler et al. use the same poverty line used by
the Government of India{the nutritional norm of 2400 calories per capita per day for rural
areas and 2100 calories per capita per day in urban areas.23 Individuals in households where
the per capita expenditure level is insucient to meet the calorie norms are classied as
in poverty.24 The headcount ratio, poverty gap index, and squared poverty gap index are
measured separately for rural and urban areas of each state; more than 70% of the Indian
population lives in rural areas.
There are alternative ways to measure poverty, but we argue that for our analysis, the
headcount ratio, poverty gap index and squared poverty gap index from Ozler et al. are
especially relevant. They are calculated in the same way as gures used by the Government
of India. Thus, these are the gures used for planning purposes and reported by the media
in India. To the extent that politicians are held accountable for poverty outcomes, it would
be these measures of poverty that would be available and used. Besley and Burgess (2000)
20These three measures belong to the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) class of poverty measures.
Whereas headcount ratio measures the incidence of poverty, poverty gap index and squared poverty gap
index capture the intensity of poverty by giving individuals farther below the poverty line more weight. For
the squared poverty gap index, each individual's poverty gap index is being weighted by the individual's
shortfall of expenditure from the poverty line. As Deaton and Dreze (2002) note, this measure, unlike
poverty gap index, is sensitive to the distribution of income below the poverty line, which is a desirable
feature for a poverty measure. However, it is more sensitive to measurement error at the bottom of the
income distribution.
21Ozler, Datt and Ravallion (1996) provided data on all three measures to 1994. Gaurav Datt provided
headcount ratio data to 2000 via personal communication, for which we are grateful. These World Bank
poverty data are also available from the LSE's EOPP website.
22NSS surveys were conducted in the years 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970,
1971, 1973, 1974, 1978, 1983, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2000. Following Besley
and Burgess (2000), we used weighted interpolation to obtain the poverty estimates for years when no NSS
survey was conducted. Our results remain when we restrict analysis to those years with NSS surveys, as we
show in Section 5.2.
23These norms were set by the Planning Commission (1993).
24The expenditure level to meet the calorie norms varies by sector (urban/rural), state and year. See Datt
(1995) for the details in constructing the poverty measures in Ozler et al.
15also used the poverty measures from Ozler et al. in their study of the eect of states' land
reform policies on poverty in India. As well, Burgess and Pande (2005) used them in their
study of the eect of increasing access to banking on poverty in India.
Minority political reservation: We measure minority political reservation as follows:
(1) percentage of seats in state assembly reserved for SC (\SC Share Reserved"); and (2)
percentage of seats in state assembly reserved for ST (\ST Share Reserved"). We obtained
information on the share of seats reserved for SCs and STs from the Election Commission of
India reports on state elections. The Election Commission is an independent agency set up in
the Indian Constitution to conduct elections, and is the authoritative source on data related
to elections. These reports contain constituency-level data for each state election, including
information about which seats are reserved for SCs and STs. We obtained useful institutional
details about minority political reservation from the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe
Commissioner's Oce's annual reports and conversations with ocials in that oce.
Minority population share controls: To estimate Equation 2, we require data on the
SC and ST share of the population according to the last preceding census and to current
population estimates. Censuses of the population are taken decennially, and we use data from
the following censuses: 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991 and 2001 (Census of India, Registrar
General). Intercensal estimates of the population are obtained via linear interpolation, as in
Pande (2003).25
Other controls: In some specications, we control for state income last year, dummy for
election year, population density in last preceding census, rural share of population and total
population. First, the state income measure we use is the log of real per capita net state
domestic product. The data source is the Planning Commission, Government of India.26
25Specically, for a given population variable (e.g., total population, SC population and ST population), we
calculate the constant annual growth rate needed for the observed initial census value to reach the observed
terminal census value. Since we are projecting SC, ST and total populations separately, we are allowing
dierential population growth rates across social groups. This interpolation method does not model the
underlying sources of population changes, and assumes smoothness in the evolution of population.
26We downloaded the data on income and deators, which were used in Besley and Burgess (2000), from
the EOPP website.
16Second, a dummy variable for election year takes on the value one when there is a state
election in year t. This information comes from the Election Commission's reports on state
elections. Third, total population count comes from the Census of India, Registrar General,
with intercensal estimates interpolated (using the same procedure described above for the
minority population). Fourth, population density is computed as the total population in the
state according to the last preceding census divided by total land area of the state. Finally,
rural population share comes from Ozler et al. and is computed from the National Sample
Survey.
The means and standard deviations of the variables used in our estimation below are
reported in Table 2.
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Main Results
We rst estimate the eect of minority political reservation on the headcount ratio, i.e.,
the percentage of the population living below the poverty line. These results are presented
in Table 3. Each column reports the results from a separate regression estimated using
ordinary least squares. The dependent variable is rural headcount ratio in Columns 1-3,
urban headcount ratio in Columns 4-6 and aggregate (rural and urban combined) poverty in
Columns 7-9. Standard errors are clustered by state.27
Column 1 shows the results from estimating Equation 1, where Equation 1 has been
modied to allow for reservations for two disadvantaged minority groups: Scheduled Castes
(\SC Share Reserved") and Scheduled Tribes (\ST Share Reserved"). The coecient for
SC Share Reserved is 0.56 and the coecient for ST Share Reserved is -1.13 and neither is
signicant with 95% condence. As discussed in Section 3, estimates using Equation 1 may be
27Though the policy variables are at the state-time level, it is desirable to cluster by state because serial
correlation may be present (Bertrand, Duo and Mullainathan, 2004).
17biased due to omitted variables bias{minority population share is positively correlated with
share of seats reserved due to the policy rule, and could be correlated with poverty as well. In
Columns 2-3, we therefore estimate Equation 2 (modied to allow for two minority groups),
which controls for population share of SCs and STs in the last preceding census as well as
the current year. Equation 2 is our preferred specication, exploiting only the variation in
minority political reservation that arises from national policies that cause reservations to be
revised and the time lags with which the revised reservations are implemented due to the
timing of state elections. In Column 2, the eects of SC and ST reservation are similar
to Column 1's after controlling for census and current population shares of SCs and STs
in the state. In Column 3, we add a few variables that might be correlated with both the
reservation variable and the outcome: state income last year, election year dummy, total
population, population density and rural share of population. We nd that SC reservation
has no impact on the incidence of poverty in rural areas, but ST reservation has a negative
and signicant eects. In particular, a one percentage point increase in seats reserved for
STs in the state legislative assembly would lead to a 1.2 percentage point decrease in the
rural poverty rate in the state.
Columns 4-6 show the parallel results with urban headcount ratio as the dependent
variable. In Columns 5 and 6, which control for census and current population shares of SCs
and STs, we nd negative point estimates, but they are not signicant with 95% condence.28
Thus, there is some weak evidence of a reduction in the incidence of poverty in urban areas
due to minority political reservations.
Not surprisingly given our ndings for rural and urban headcount ratio, in Columns 7-9
we nd that SC reservation does not aect aggregate poverty but ST reservation reduces it.
In particular, a one percentage point increase in seats reserved for STs in the state legislature
would lead to a 1.1 percentage point decrease in the aggregate poverty rate in the state.
Besides the impact of minority political reservation on the incidence of poverty, the impact
28In Column 6, the coecient for ST reservation is signicant at the 10% level.
18on the intensity of poverty is also of interest. In Table 4, we show the eects on poverty-gap
index (Columns 1-4) and squared poverty gap index (Columns 5-8). In both rural and urban
areas, ST reservation reduces the depth of poverty (measured by the poverty gap index) and
the severity of poverty (measured by squared poverty gap index). This is suggestive that ST
reservation did not only bring people just below the poverty line across it. It also appears
to have helped those further below the poverty line.
It makes sense that ST reservation would have a much larger impact in rural areas than
urban areas. Over 90% of the ST population resides in rural areas, and the ST poverty rate
is 47% in rural areas compared to 33% in urban areas, so we might expect that eorts to
improve ST well-being would be focused on rural areas.29 Perhaps the surprise is that ST
reservation should reduce urban poverty at all. However, even in cities the STs tend to live
in pockets together, making them possible to target aid to. Moreover, it could be that the
urban poor{both from minority and non-minority groups{are beneting from the general
poverty reduction policies that ST state legislators tend to push. It is likely that the poor in
non-ST social groups experience some benets because otherwise the eect on ST poverty
in urban areas seems quite large.30
To summarize, the main result of this paper is that minority political reservation reduced
poverty in India. Specically, we nd that reserving more seats for STs signicantly reduces
the incidence and intensity of poverty in rural and urban areas. We do not nd a signicant
eect of SC reservation on any of our poverty measures, though we cannot rule out a modest
negative eect on the urban poverty rate. Though the estimates are somewhat imprecise,
generally we nd that the eects of ST reservation is statistically signicantly dierent from
29The gures are based on 2004-05 National Sample Survey data.
30For example, in 2004-05, though one-third of urban STs are poor, urban STs account for less than 4% of
the urban poor. The point estimates in Table 3 suggest that a one percentage point increase in reserved seats
for STs leads to a 0.4 percentage point reduction in the urban poverty rate. If this eect came entirely from
reductions in ST urban poverty, then 10% of the ST urban poor would be exiting poverty. Alternatively, ST
urban poverty decreases by less with poverty for other groups declining also.
19the eects of SC reservation.31
Our ndings are consistent with Pande (2003). She found that ST political reservations in
the state legislature signicantly raised spending on ST welfare programs while SC political
reservations are associated with more state government jobs reserved for minorities; ST
reservation did not aect job reservations and SC reservation did not aect spending on SC
welfare programs. More spending on ST welfare programs would tend to reduce poverty
more, especially in rural areas (since over 90% of STs live in rural areas). On the other
hand, more public sector jobs for minorities would tend to help the better o more (though
there are some unskilled government jobs, most require skills that the poor are less likely to
possess), so there would be less impact on the poverty margin. Of course there are numerous
channels through which representation in the state assembly could aect poverty, and the
policies analyzed by Pande are only a subset, but even looking at this subset we can see why
ST reservation might be more likely to reduce poverty, especially rural poverty, while SC
reservation might not have a measured eect on poverty.
Thus, the ndings from our study and Pande collectively suggest that one channel through
which minority reservation in state legislative assemblies aects poverty is changing state
policies. Although gaining a seat or two clearly does not change the fact that SC/ST state
legislators lack votes for unilateral action (i.e., the median voter in the state legislature is
still a non-SC/ST), it may eect policy change through increasing SC/ST political voice
and perhaps also their value to non-minority legislators for purposes of forming coalitions.
It is interesting why SC and ST reservation is associated with dierent policy changes and
poverty eects, and we investigate this more in Section 5.3.
31In Tables 3 and 4, the last line displays the results of F-tests of the equality of the eects of ST and SC
political reservation.
205.2 Robustness Checks
We have been interpreting the estimated coecient for the minority political reservation
variable in Equation 2 as the causal eect of minority political reservation. The foundation
for this causal interpretation is that we are only using within-state cross-time variation in
seats reserved arising from national policies that cause reservations to be revised and the
time lags with which revised reservations are implemented. In this subsection, we consider
several hypotheses that would confound a causal interpretation.
Control for nonlinear eects of minority population share: Our identication
strategy is a regression-discontinuity-type approach in the sense that share of seats reserved
for minorities in the state assembly is a discontinuous function of their population share
in the state. Thus it is essential to control adequately for minority population share so
that identication is solely from the discontinuities. In our preferred specication (Equation
2), we controlled linearly for minority population share in the last census as well as in
the current year. This leaves open the possibility that we are incorrectly attributing some
nonlinear eects of minority population share to minority political reservation. We address
this concern in the following three robustness checks. To preview these results, we nd
our results remain even when we control for more complex functional forms for minority
population share.
First, we augment Equation 2 with quadratic controls for SC and ST population share
in the last preceding census. The estimated eects of ST Share Reserved and SC Share
Reserved for this specication are shown in Table 5, Column 2 (Column 1 reports the results
of the original specication, which were previously shown in Table 3, Columns 3, 6 and 9,
to facilitate comparison). The eects are the same as before: there is no eect of SC Share
Reserved on any of the poverty measures, and ST Share Reserved has a negative signicant
eect.
Second, we add to Equation 2 one and two-year lagged values of current population share
21of SC and ST for each state. These estimated eects, shown in Column 3, are essentially
unchanged from the baseline eects in Column 1.
Finally, we restrict our sample to a narrower window around the discontinuous points,
i.e., election years in which revised reservations are rst implemented. Specically, we only
use observations two years before, during and after such an election year in the state. The
results are displayed in Column 4. Despite the reduction in number of observations (195
instead of 616), the coecients are similar in magnitude and precision.
Restrict to years with NSS data: Our poverty measures are constructed based on
25 rounds of NSS data. The poverty measures are interpolated for years when NSS data
are not available. This will tend to cause measurement error in the dependent variable. If
this were classical measurement error, then our estimates would be consistent though less
precise. However, it is possible that there is nonclassical measurement error such that the
estimates might not even be consistent. To address this concern, we drop the years for which
the poverty estimates were interpolated: 1964, 1972, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1979, 1980, 1981,
1982, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1989, 1993, 1998 and 1999. The results using this smaller sample are
shown in Column 5. The estimated eects are similar to the original ones. Thus, the eects
of minority reservation that we estimate are not mere artifacts of using some interpolated
data.
5.3 Why Might the Eects of SC and ST Reservation Dier?
It intriguing that SC and ST political reservation have dierent impacts on poverty,
and in this subsection we explore some potential reasons for this. In particular, we consider
the following dierences between SC and ST communities: (1) STs tend to be more geo-
graphically isolated; (2) STs tend to live in more homogeneous communities; and (3) STs
have more steadfast support for the Congress Party. Since most Indians live in rural areas
and most of the estimated reduction in poverty is in rural areas, we only display estimation
results using rural headcount ratio as the outcome. As a caveat to these results, we note
22that this analysis is crude (and is meant to be suggestive rather than denitive), and there
could be a variety of other explanations for the dierential eects.
Geographic isolation: STs are more geographically isolated than SCs. STs are more
likely to live in local communities concentrated with other STs.32 SCs, though, are fairly
evenly distributed throughout the state, and rarely comprise a majority in their local commu-
nities. The geographic concentration of STs may facilitate the targeting of resources toward
them (i.e., provide resources to STs without much slippage to other social groups). For
example, it could be eective to provide aid to the entire community without eort singling
out which households qualify for the aid.
To assess this story, we allow the eects of reservation to dier by an index of isolation.
We follow Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (1999) and use the the standard index of isolation{
which gives the probability that the average minority in a particular geographical area (they
use US city, we use Indian state) will meet another minority{adjusted for the prevalence of
minorities in the area.33 We apply this to district level data on the rural population from
the 1971 census.34 On average in the 16 states, the unadjusted index of isolation for both
SCs and STs is 0.19, which means that for a member of either minority group, there is a
19% chance a randomly drawn person from the district he/she resides in will be of the same
group. However, SCs comprised 15% of population and STs comprised only 8%, so a 19%
meeting probability implies very dierent things for each group; apparently, the STs are more
segregated because they are more than twice as likely to meet than if STs were uniformly
distributed across the districts within each state. The adjusted index of isolation is 0.03 for
SCs and 0.11 for STs, capturing the greater isolation of STs relative to SCs (a value of zero
represents no isolation).
32Though STs account for about 8% of the overall population, they often account for a majority of the
population in their local communities.
33For each state s, this is: dpopshared*minshared-popshares where popshared is the minority group's
share of total population in district d, minshared is district d's share of the total minority population in the
state, and popshares is the minority share of total population in state s.
34We thank Rohini Somanathan for providing us with these data, which were part of the data set for
Banerjee and Somanathan (2007).
23In Table 6, Column 2, we estimate Equation 2 adding interactions between minority
reservation and the adjusted index of isolation.35 The coecients for the interaction terms
are not signicant, and the eects of SC and ST reservation are basically unchanged from
the original specication (of which results are reported in Column 1). This does not support
our hypothesis that the dierential eects of SC and ST reservation are due to the greater
isolation of STs. However, literally what we have found is that within-group increases in
isolation does not change the eect of the group's reservation; it remains possible that cross-
group dierences in eects are due to cross-group dierences in isolation. Additionally, it
could be that the district is too large an area to use for forming the isolation measures;
perhaps residential segregation at a more local level are more relevant for thinking about
how aid and public goods are distributed. Thus, while it might be premature to discard the
dierential isolation story, we do not nd direct evidence of it here.
Social heterogeneity: Within a local community, members of STs tend to be from
the same specic scheduled tribe whereas there is more within-group heterogeneity among
members of SCs (even in a given locality, there are numerous castes and subcastes within
SCs). The greater homogeneity within the local community among members of STs may
improve the ecacy of these resources (e.g., more cooperative outcome, better delivery)
(Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005).
To assess this story, we allow the eects of reservation to dier by caste fragmentation.
We use the district caste fragmentation measures from Banerjee and Somanathan (2007),
and population weigh them to the state level.36 Thus, we have a measure of local social het-
erogeneity among Hindus for the average person in the state. As Somanathan and Banerjee
35Note the main eect of the index of isolation is absorbed by the state xed eects.
36We thank Rohini Somanathan for providing us with these data. Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) use a
social group fragmentation measure that includes not only the Hindu castes, but also other religious groups.
We are primarily interested in measuring heterogeneity among Hindus so we use the caste fragmentation
measure. Banerjee and Romanathan use 1931 census data, which is the last census providing detailed caste
information for the population, and apply the standard fractionalization index for each district as follows:
1-cpopshare2
c where popsharec is the population share of the cth caste. Given the sheer number of caste
groups, they restricted analysis to castes that form at least 1% of the population of each state, leaving them
with 185 caste groups.
24noted, India has a great deal of social heterogeneity; on average in the 16 states, the index is
0.93, compared to 0.29 calculated by Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) for US cities using
racial groups.
In Table 6, Column 3, we estimate Equation 2 adding interactions between minority
reservation and caste fragmentation.37 It appears that increasing caste fragmentation reduces
the eectiveness of SC reservations in ghting poverty{the coecient for the interaction
is positive and signicant. However, caste fragmentation does not signicantly aect ST
reservation's impact on poverty; this makes sense because STs are typically not part of the
Hindu caste system, so ST state legislators should not be materially adversely aected by
caste fragmentation. Thus, while SC reservations may be eective at getting more resources
for SCs (as previous studies have documented), there may be more contention over where
these resources should go because of the greater social heterogeneity. Since it is the better o
among the SCs who tend to win the seats reserved for SCs (Dushkin, 1972), more resources
allocated in favor of SCs may end up going to the better o among the SCs (e.g. positions
as heads of ministries, government jobs, scholarships), so poverty decreases by less (if at
all) due to SC reservation. These results, thus, appear supportive of the idea that social
heterogeneity may in part be responsible for the dierential eects of ST and SC reservation.
Support for the Congress Party: Motivated by Banerjee and Somanathan (2007),
who nd that changes in SC/ST support for the Indian National Congress Party can help
explain the dierential impact of SC/ST population share on public good access, we consider
the role of support for the Congress Party.38The Congress Party has historically been the
dominant party in Indian politics, though in recent decades has faced increasing competition.
The decline in support for the Congress Party has been especially pronounced among SCs.39
37Note the main eect of the caste fragmentation variable is absorbed by the state xed eects.
38In particular, they nd using constituency level data from 1971 and 1991 that increases in SC population
share increase access to public goods like health facilities, high schools and piped water, but increases in
ST population share did not. Analysis suggests that these eects can in part be explained by SCs' relative
decline in support for the Congress Party, which has been coupled by increasing support for parties catering
to SCs.
39For example, Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) report that SCs won 68% of Parliament seats reserved
25The Congress Party has a strong stated anti-poverty stance which originated in the 1971,
when Indira Gandhi campaigned for Prime Minister with \Garibi Hatao" (Abolish Poverty)
as her slogan and won re-election. Thus it seems natural to ask whether the larger eect of
ST reservation on poverty that we nd might be related to STs' more steadfast support for
the Congress Party.
To assess this story, we estimate Equation 2 adding interactions between minority reser-
vation and support for Congress. We use two measures of support for Congress, both based
on the share reserved seats won by the Congress Party in the lower Parliament (Lok Sabha).40
One measure is simply the share of SC (ST) reserved seats won by Congress, and a second
is a dummy indicating whether the share is at least 50%. We display the results in Table 6,
Columns 4 and 5. A couple of things are interesting to note. First, the eect of Congress
Party share of Parliament seats on rural poverty is negative, and signicant at least at the
10% level, which corroborates with the idea that increased support for Congress party is
associated with lower poverty.4142 Second, the interaction eects are positive for SC reserva-
tion but negative for ST reservation so there is not a simple story. When looking at Column
5 with the Congress Party majority measure, we nd that the coecient for the interaction
between ST reservation and Congress support is negative; this is consistent with the idea
that ST reservation is more eective at reducing poverty where there is high support for
Congress.43 On the other hand, when looking at Column 4 with the continuous Congress
for SCs in 1971 but only 41% in 1991; in contrast, STs won 77% of Parliament seats reserved for STs in 1971
and 67% in 1991. There is variation in changes in SC and ST support for the Congress Party across states
though.
40We compiled a state-time panel of total Parliament seats, SC reserved seats and ST reserved seats both
overall and won by the Congress Party from reports of results for general elections held 1962-1999 published
by the Election Commission of India.
41For Column 4, the coecient for \Congress Party share of all Parliament seats" is -0.085 (s.e.: 0.0.32)
and for Column 5, the coecient for the dummy \Congress Party has at least 50% of all Parliament seats"
is -3.300 (s.e.: 1.647). We have not reported these main eects in Table 6 to conserve space.
42Of course it should be recognized that election outcomes could be endogenous so these this may not have
a causal interpretation. It could be that having more Congress members in Parliament reduces poverty more
(because, say, Congress allocates more resources for ghting poverty than other parties), but it could also
be that Congress candidates are more likely to get elected when the economy is better (poverty is lower).
43Though, see previous footnote.
26Party share of seats measure, the interaction between SC reservation and Congress support
is positive and signicant. What may be key is that for SCs and STs, dierent alterna-
tive political parties are available, with SCs having more parties catering to their interests.
Perhaps given the existing political landscape, the best STs can do is go along with the
Congress Party{at least there would be some reduction in poverty; in a counterfactual world
where there are more parties catering to STs, perhaps supporting Congress would not reduce
poverty as much as supporting those new parties.
5.4 Reservation in State Legislative Assemblies After the 73rd and
74th Amendments
In April 1993, the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Indian Constitution came into
eect, which formalized local government institutions and devolved more power from the
state to local governments. These reforms also stipulate that one-third of local elected of-
ces be reserved for women, and the reserved seats for SCs and STs be in proportion to their
population. In practice, government continues to be highly centralized in India, but local
governments have typically been given the authority to select beneciaries for government
welfare programs and to allocate funds for building and maintaining local infrastructure (Du-
o, 2004; Besley, Pande, Rahman and Rao, 2004). The devolution of power and introduction
of reservation to local governments could change the way SC and ST reservation in the state
assemblies aect poverty. It could lead to greater reductions in poverty because local leaders
know better than state bureaucrats about which households are in direst need and what
public goods are most useful. On the other hand, decentralization could lead to local elite
capture, which could worsen poverty (e.g., Johnson, Deshingkar and Start, 2005); having
benign state bureaucrats make resource allocation decisions may serve the poor better than
giving the local elites the power.
We test for whether the eect of reservation in the state legislative assemblies changed
27after the devolution of power in two ways. Our rst exercise is simply to allow the eect
of reservation to vary before and after 1993, when the amendments became law. Not all
states implemented the reforms immediately, and so as a second exercise we allow the eect
of reservation to vary before and after the rst Gram Panchayat (village council) election in
the state after 1993.44
In Table 6, Column 6, we estimate Equation 2 adding interactions between minority
reservation and a dummy for 1993 and later.45 We nd that SC reservation has no impact
on rural poverty incidence either before or after 1993. However, ST reservation causes a
larger reduction in rural headcount ratio after 1993; the pre-1993 and post-1993 eects are
dierent from each other at the 5% signicance level. In Table 6, Column 7, we estimate
Equation 2 adding interactions between minority reservation and a dummy for year of the
rst local election and later. The results are as in Column 6, though now the pre/post-
reform eects are dierent only at the 15% signicance level. These results are suggestive
that that the 73rd amendment (which applied to rural governing bodies) enhanced the ability
of ST reservations in the state legislature to ght poverty.46 The devolution of power, and
mandated minority representation in local governing bodies, perhaps improved targeting and
made the STs preferences more salient, leading to an ultimate resource allocation that was
more eective at reducing rural poverty.
Why doesn't devolution of power, and mandated minority representation in local govern-
ment bodies, enhance the ability of SC reservation in the state legislature to ght poverty
as well? It must be pointed out that there is nothing to enhance{SC reservation in the state
legislature does not appear to redirect resources in a way that reduces poverty. It could
44This approach is attractive in the sense that only after the rst election is the local government with
the new reservations and new responsibilities in place. However, the timing of the rst local election is
potentially endogenous.
45For this analysis, we drop Jammu and Kashmir because we have no poverty data for this state in the
after period. In fact, results do not change if we include this state's observations.
46We must use caution in interpreting these results. Our data set ends in 2000, leaving only seven years
of post-1993 observations. The local governments are still a work in progress, and we do not know if the
shorter run eects will apply in the longer run. Moreover, many changes have occurred in India since 1993
besides the passage of the 73rd and 74th Amendments.
28be that with or without the promise of more eective targeting at the local level, SC state
legislators (for whatever reasons, including what we discussed in Section 5.3) do not pursue
policies and spending decisions that help people near the poverty line. Alternatively, it could
be that SC state legislators would undertake more anti-poverty actions if they could be as-
sured there would not be mistargeting, but they believe local elite capture could undermine
the potential benets of decentralization.
6 Discussion
This paper is the rst to quantify the eect of an armative action policy on poverty,
and among the few to estimate an overall eect of an armation action policy (i.e., not only
the eect on the intended beneciaries). We used a natural experiment in India to identify
the eect of political reservations for disadvantaged minority groups on overall poverty. The
Indian Constitution stipulates that the number of seats reserved for Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes in the state legislative assemblies must be in proportion to each group's
share of the state population as enumerated in the most recent census. There is a time
lag, though, between when reservations are revised (say, due to the arrival of a new census
count) and when the revised reservations get implemented due to the staggered timing of
state elections. This permits the identication of the eect of minority political reservation
while controlling for minority population share since the former is a discontinuous function
of the latter. Applying this empirical strategy to panel data on Indian states for 1960-2000,
we nd that SC political reservation had no impact on poverty while ST political reservation
reduced both the incidence and intensity of poverty. Increasing the share of seats reserved
for STs by one percentage point reduced poverty in India by 1.1 percentage points. Much
of the reduction is in rural areas; a one percentage point increase in ST reservation lowers
rural poverty by 1.2 percentage points and urban poverty by 0.6 percentage points.
This paper provides evidence that, contrary to widespread belief, the benets from af-
29rmative action are not always captured by the better o. Indeed, in the case of political
reservation for STs in India, the poor{including those far below the poverty line{have ben-
eted too. Thus, minority political reservation is a policy that is both pro-minority and
pro-poor.
Given the net reduction in poverty, likely there was redistribution from richer to poorer.47
But governments routinely engage in income redistribution, which is perceived as far less
controversial than redistribution from one ethnic group to another. Assuming that non-
minorities gain no more than minorities (which seems reasonable given the previous studies
showing the reservations lead to resource reallocations in favor of the targeted group), the
political reservation policy generated more gains to minorities than losses to non-minorities.
It is even possible that both minorities and non-minorities gain (e.g., because ST legislators
strongly promote anti-poverty programs). So though we cannot rule out that there is redis-
tribution from non-minorities to minorities, we can say that it does not appear to be the
non-minorities near the poverty line who are bearing the expense for the minorities' gains
(for if they were, overall poverty would not have declined). Moreover, given that there are
net gains for the policy, it should be possible to oer compensation to any non-minorities
near the poverty line who are made worse o.
The empirical evidence in this paper suggests that the eects of armation action poli-
cies estimated in one context may be hard to generalize to other contexts. We found that
while political reservations for one social group, the STs, did help reduce poverty, political
reservations for another similarly impoverished group, the SCs, did not.48 This mirrors a
nding from Prakash (2008), who estimates the eects of reserving government jobs for dis-
47Minority political reservation might generate eciency gains which could help reduce poverty even with-
out income redistribution. Duo, Fischer and Chattopadhyay (2008) suggested one way minority political
representation could increase eciency{it increases information about preferences of minorities, leading to a
more optimal allocation of resources earmarked for minorities. There are other mechanisms. For example,
it could end a nutrition-based (or more generally, a human-capital-based) poverty trap. This means that
providing extra consumption to people below poverty has higher returns than providing the same extra
consumption to richer people.
48SC political reservation may nonetheless be benecial to SCs and other social groups, but just not in
terms of reducing poverty.
30advantaged minorities on their employment outcomes in India{SC job reservations help the
SCs, but ST job reservations do not appear to help the STs. This is also consistent with
Pande (2003), who nds that SC political reservation changed policies in dierent ways than
ST political reservation. The preferences of SCs and STs dier, and some of the constraints
that they face dier too, and these dierences have implications for the eects of armative
action policies. Given this, it seems useful to state clearly what are the objectives of arma-
tive action so that the appropriate policies can be designed to meet these objectives; broad
stroke armative action policies are unlikely accomplish them for all groups.
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35TABLE 1
Legislation Aecting Share of State Legislative Assembly Seats Reserved for SCs and STs
during 1960-92
Year First
Name of Legislation Implemented Explanation
Two-Member Constituencies 1962 Two-member territorial
Abolition Act 1961 constituencies abolished
Punjab Reorganization Act 1966 1967 Reorganization of Haryana
and Punjab
Delimitation Commission Act 1962 1967 Revised in line with 1961 census count
Delimitation Act 1972 1974 Revised in line with 1971 census count
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe 1977 Denitions of SCs and STs
Orders Act of 1976 made uniform within a state,
leading to ocial revisions of 1971 census






Headcount ratio (Aggregate) 46.47 (13.93)
Headcount ratio (Rural) 48.28 (14.75)
Headcount ratio (Urban) 39.97 (13.90)
Poverty gap index (Rural) 14.60 (6.22)
Poverty gap index (Urban) 12.22 (5.63)
Squared poverty gap index (Rural) 5.87 (3.18)
Squared poverty gap index (Urban) 4.86 (2.83)
Minority Political Reservation (%):
SC share reserved 14.12 (5.36)
ST share reserved 7.43 (7.72)
Minority Population Share Controls (%):
SC census population share 14.56 (5.54)
ST census population share 7.59 (7.54)
SC current population share 14.65 (5.60)
ST current population share 7.56 (7.48)
Other Controls:
Log of state income per capita last year 6.98 (0.39)
Election dummy 0.23 (0.42)
Population density 260.71 (170.01)
Rural population share (%) 77.96 (8.14)
Total population 4.30e+07 (2.87e+07)
Notes: State-year data for the 16 major Indian states from 1960-2000 as described in Section 4.
There are 627 observations for all variables except state income last year, poverty-gap index,
and squared poverty-gap index. State income last year has 616 observations because the state income
data series does not begin until 1960. Poverty gap index and squared poverty gap
index have 537 observations because they are available only 1960-1994.
37TABLE 3
Eect of Minority Political Representation on Incidence of Poverty
Headcount Ratio
Rural Urban Aggregate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
SC Share Reserved 0:561 0:806 0:439  0:303  0:401  0:448 0:462 0:648 0:335
(0.681) (0.818) (0.741) (0.411) (0.357) (0.354) (0.600) (0.686) (0.573)
ST Share Reserved  1:127  1:067  1:242  0:513  0:385  0:606  1:026  0:890  1:106
(0.690) (0.759) (0.543) (0.413) (0.451) (0.338) (0.635) (0.700) (0.495)
SC Census Pop Share  0:563 0:947  0:605 0:121  0:768 0:592
(1.056) (0.750) (0.545) (0.895) (0.736) (0.583)
ST Census Pop Share 0:166 0:115  0:363  0:242 0:137 0:150
(0.998) (0.824) (0.521) (0.352) (0.901) (0.686)
SC Current Pop Share  1:176  1:443 2:008 1:830  0:314  0:597
(0.972) (1.143) (0.705) (0.985) (0.730) (0.938)
ST Current Pop Share 0:095  0:020  0:069  0:355  0:152  0:303
(1.047) (0.747) (0.699) (0.548) (0.907) (0.605)
State Income Last Year  20:381  0:252  16:254
(4.131) (2.607) (3.543)
Population Density  0:073  0:045  0:065
(0.030) (0.024) (0.028)
Election Year Dummy 0:448 0.542 0:449
(0.621) (0.366) (0.461)
Rural Population Share 0:755 0.527 0:732
(0.684) (0.526) (0.567)
Total Population 1:11e   07 1:73e   07 1:38e   07
(1.05e-07) (8.98e-08) (9.35e-08)
State and Year Fixed Eects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
No of Observations 627 627 616 627 627 616 627 627 616
Adjusted R2 0.81 0.82 0.86 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.85 0.86 0.89
p-value of F-test of equality of eects of SC and ST shares reserved
[0.097] [0.061] [0.037] [0.709] [0.974] [0.720] [0.107] [0.085] [0.029]
Notes: Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. \SC(ST) Census Pop Share" is the SC (ST) share of the state population according
to the last preceding census. \SC(ST) Current Pop Share" is the SC (ST) share of the state population measured in the current year.
Asterisks denote signicance levels (*=.10, **=.05, ***=.01)
3
8TABLE 4
Eect of Minority Political Representation on Intensity of Poverty
Poverty Gap Index Squared Poverty Gap Index
Rural Urban Rural Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SC Share Reserved 0:352 0:168  0:116  0:218 0:207 0:119  0:056  0:127
(0.285) (0.249) (0.133) (0.161) (0.130) (0.110) (0.072) (0.089)
ST Share Reserved  0:267  0:336  0:420  0:471  0:091  0:123  0:248  0:242
(0.246) (0.171) (0.166) (0.152) (0.119) (0.079) (0.108) (0.100)
SC Census Pop Share  0:110 0:473  0:528  0:086  0:035 0:259  0:187 0:052
(0.442) (0.287) (0.379) (0.275) (0.282) (0.190) (0.252) (0.177)
ST Census Pop Share  0:509  0:484  0:159  0:015  0:452  0:446  0:106  0:033
(0.238) (0.170) (0.273) (0.222) (0.118) (0.092) (0.185) (0.141)
SC Current Pop Share  0:205  0:329 1:102 0:885  0:002  0:034 0:496 0:367
(0.369) (0.271) (0.397) (0.297) (0.230) (0.174) (0.246) (0.179)
ST Current Pop Share 0:524 0:496 0:267 0:119 0:454 0:429 0:240 0:170
(0.332) (0.298) (0.335) (0.246) (0.198) (0.191) (0.189) (0.139)
State Income Last Year  6:622  0:153  3:177  0:363
(2.337) (1.507) (1.498) (0.818)
Population Density  0:035  0:028  0:020  0:015
(0.015) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006)
Election Year Dummy 0:004 0:274  0:079 0:147
(0.234) (0.178) (0.099) (0.098)
Rural Population Share 0:644 0:782 0:309 0:496
(0.285) (0.312) (0.170) (0.202)
Total Population 3:67e   08 5:92e   08 1:27e   08 9:99e   09
(6.04e-08) (3.26e-08) (3.75e-08) (1.84e-08)
State and Year Fixed Eects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
No of Observations 537 526 537 526 537 526 537 526
Adjusted R2 0.82 0.86 0.88 0.91 0.79 0.83 0.84 0.88
p-value of F-test of equality of eects of SC and ST shares reserved
[0.081] [0.072] [0.109] [0.143] [0.085] [0.068] [0.085] [0.234]
Notes: Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. \SC(ST) Census Pop Share" is the SC (ST) share of the state population according
to the last preceding census. \SC(ST) Current Pop Share" is the SC (ST) share of the state population measured in the current year.




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PANEL A: Rural Headcount Ratio
SC Share Reserved 0:439 0:282 0:461 0:048 0.479
(0.741) (0.708) (0.719) (0.515) (0.687)
ST Share Reserved  1:242  1:550  1:183  1:210  1:272
(0.543) (0.381) (0.569) (0.548) (0.528)
PANEL B: Urban Headcount Ratio
SC Share Reserved  0:448  0:620  0:452  0:760  0:332
(0.354) (0.443) (0.354) (0.450) (0.317)
ST Share Reserved  0:606  0:943  0:583  1:030  0:469
(0.338) (0.371) (0.355) (0.451) (0.373)
PANEL C: Aggregate Headcount Ratio
SC Share Reserved 0.335 0:170 0:349 0:006 0.387
(0.573) (0.562) (0.556) (0.435) (0.542)
ST Share Reserved  1:106  1:436  1:059  1:122  1:097
(0.495) (0.322) (0.519) (0.479) (0.494)
Notes: Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. Results displayed in each panel-column
come from a separate regression that also controls for state and time xed eects, SC and ST population
share in the last preceding census, and SC and ST current population share, state income per capita last year,
election year dummy, total population, population density in last preceding census and
rural population share. The regressions in each column have the following additional features:
Column (1) shows the estimates originally reported in Table 3, Columns 3, 6 and 9.
Column (2) adds as controls the square of SC and ST population shares in the last preceding census.
Column (3) adds as controls the SC and ST population shares one and two years ago.
Column (4) restricts the sample to those observations within a ve-year window centered around
elections in which the minority political reservation changed in the state.
Column (5) restricts the sample to years when NSS data was available.
The number of observations is 616, 195 and 365 in Columns 1-3, 4 and 5, respectively.
Asterisks denote signicance levels (*=.10, **=.05, ***=.01)
40TABLE 6
Heterogeneity in Eect on Rural Headcount Ratio
Base Isolation Social Heterogeneity Congress Support Congress Support 73rd Amendment 73rd Amendment
Variable 1: SC isolation % Caste frag. % SC Congress % SC Congress majority After 1993 After 1st local election
Variable 2: ST isolation % Caste frag. % ST Congress % ST Congress majority After 1993 After 1st local election
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
SC Share Reserved 0:439 0:507 0:462  0:227  0:236 0:408 0:535
(0.741) (0.777) (0.458) (0.591) (0.560) (0.802) (0.809)
ST Share Reserved  1:242  1:275  1:221  1:197  1:180  1:239  1:257
(0.543) (0.514) (0.402) (0.636) (0.579) (0.577) (0.577)
SC Share Reserved x Variable 1  0:024 0:258 0:004 0:046 0:202 0:520
(0.133) (0.092) (0.002) (0.107) (0.272) (0.327)
ST Share Reserved x Variable 2 0:049 0:179  0:000  0:202  0:363  0:225
(0.103) (0.350) (0.002) (0.175) (0.139) (0.138)
Mean (s.d.) for Variable 1 2:954 93:472 52:383 0:597 0:205 0:131
(3.820) (3.769) (39.956) (0.491) (0.404) (0.338)
Mean (s.d.) for Variable 2 11:584 93:472 34:997 0:400 0:205 0:131
(11.135) (3.769) (41.085) (0.490) (0.404) (0.338)
Notes: Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. Results displayed in each column come from a separate
regression that also controls for state and time xed eects, SC and ST population share in the last preceding census,
and SC and ST current population share, state income per capita last year, election year dummy, total population,
population density in last preceding census and rural population share. In addition, the specication in Columns 4-5
control for Congress Party share of SC, ST and all Parliament seats, and that in Column 6 controls
for a dummy indicating year after rst local election. In Columns 2-4, components of interaction terms have been
demeaned so the coecient for SC (ST) Share Reserved gives the eect at the mean value of
Variable 1 (Variable 2). Column (1) shows the estimates originally reported in Table 3, Column 3.
The number of observations is 616, 600 and 586 in Columns 1-3, 4-5 and 6-7, respectively.
Asterisks denote signicance levels (*=.10, **=.05, ***=.01)
4
1Figure 1 
Illustration of Identification Strategy 
 
 














1960      1960-1966: 
Seats based on 1951 Census  Census  1961     
  1962  Election   
         
  1967  Election    1967-1976: 
Seats based on 1961 Census  Census  1971     
  1972  Election   
         











Seats based on 1971 Census 
Census  1981   
  1982  Election 
  1987  Election 
Census  1991   
  1992  Election 
  1997  Election 
  2000   
 
 